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Abstract—Blockchain is a technology uniquely suited to sup-
port massive number of transactions and smart contracts within
the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem, thanks to the decen-
tralized accounting mechanism. In a blockchain network, the
states of the accounts are stored and updated by the validator
nodes, interconnected in a peer-to-peer fashion. IoT devices are
characterized by relatively low computing capabilities and low
power consumption, as well as sporadic and low-bandwidth
wireless connectivity. An IoT device connects to one or more
validator nodes to observe or modify the state of the accounts. In
order to interact with the most recent state of accounts, a device
needs to be synchronized with the blockchain copy stored by the
validator nodes. In this work, we describe general architectures
and synchronization protocols that enable synchronization of the
IoT endpoints to the blockchain, with different communication
costs and security levels. We model and analytically characterize
the traffic generated by the synchronization protocols, and also
investigate the power consumption and synchronization trade-
off via numerical simulations. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study that rigorously models the role of wireless
connectivity in blockchain-powered IoT systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The blockchain protocols have recently attracted enormous
interest from researchers and industry, appearing to be a
promising, but still not mature, technology. This protocol
family stems from the Bitcoin specification [1], proposing
a cryptographic-based solution to the problem of keeping
consistent copies of a distributed database in a permission-less
network. The idea has been extended by Ethereum protocol
[2], where the database that is used to keep track of the
states of accounts was augmented by a scripting functionality
that permits any computer in the network to reconstruct the
accounts’ state by simply reading the database. However, the
database is hard to tamper with, as its modification requires
the investment of computational resources.
The blockchain protocols offer interesting applications for
the IoT ecosystem [3], mainly seen in the possibility of
stipulating smart contracts [4]. A smart contract is an account,
whose state can be read and modified by any device accord-
ing to predefined functions. If the state contains credits, a
smart contract can regulate economic transactions, e.g., micro-
payments, among devices. For instance, a smart contract can
be used to mimic the presence of a central authority in a decen-
tralized smart energy application, where the contract is stored
and updated by devices themselves [5]. However, in the IoT
context, the modest storage and processing capabilities of the
Fig. 1. Information exchange for the micro-payments.
devices may require the presence of an external infrastructure
to store the smart contracts.
Fig. 1 illustrates the steps of a credit transaction regu-
lated by smart contract. Two IoT devices are connected to
the peer-to-peer blockchain network, whose nodes store the
smart contract, maintain the blockchain and update it with
new information blocks. A device can request the blockchain
network to update the smart contract state, e.g., to attribute
some credit to another device (step 3 in Fig. 1). The other
devices are informed of this update when they receive a new
block containing the updated state (step 4 in Fig. 1). Finally,
the recipient device can verify the new state and release a
service to the sender (step 5 in Fig. 1). The mechanism enables
the exchange of credit in absence of mutual trust, since the
economic transaction is certified by a third party, i.e., the
blockchain network, and hardly reversible [6]. The objective
is to assure that each device locally observes the same state
of the smart contract, such that the key element in the system
design is how each device stays synchronized with the most
recent version of the blockchain.
In this paper, we characterize the traffic between the
blockchain network and the IoT devices. The critical problems
in this context are: (i) the low computational and (ii) storage
resources that prevent IoT devices to act as blockchain valida-
tors, and (iii) limited communication resources. In fact, smart
meters, and IoT devices in general, access the network via
low-bandwidth wireless links. In addition, their connectivity
is sporadic, e.g., due to energy saving policies, or limited
access to channel resources. In this work, we establish two
possible protocols for interacting with the blockchain network.
Each protocol has different communication requirements and
provides a different security level. We then propose a traffic
model that can be used to extract measures of interest, such
as the time needed for the blockchain synchronization, or the
minimal bandwidth requirements to stay synchronized. We an-
alyze the probability of keeping the IoT devices synchronized
with the blockchain and investigate trade-offs among duty
cycle (i.e., sleeping duration), goodput offered by the wireless
link, and blockchain parameters (i.e., the block generation
frequency and its size). The key contribution is the explicit
modeling of the impact that wireless connectivity has on the
blockchain synchronization and smart contract execution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the main concepts of a blockchain protocol. Sec-
tion III presents the system model. Section IV elaborates the
synchronization protocols under consideration, whose analysis
is perfomed in Section V. Section VI presents the numerical
results. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL
In this section, we focus on the blockchain concepts that are
relevant for this work; the reader is referred to [6] for a detailed
overview. A blockchain is a concatenated list of blocks, stored
in multiple copies by the nodes of the blockchain network. Part
of the nodes act as validators, i.e., they append new blocks to
their local copy and also send them to the rest of the nodes.
The distribution of new blocks happens in a peer-to-peer
fashion. When a block is received, it is validated before it can
be appended to the local list. In order to be perform validation,
a node has to invest resources that are referred to as Proof of
Works (PoWs); PoWs are typically computational resources
needed to solve cryptographic-based problems. In case that
different subsets of nodes have different local blockchains with
the same number of blocks (e.g., caused by a communication
network partition) the contention is solved in a consensus-
based manner. At any time, the validators trust the longest
known blockchain in the network.
1) Data structures: A blockchain block is composed of a
header and a body. The body contains the list of transactions
that are verified by the block, and has a maximum size. Each
transaction is represented by a data structure, composed by
a set of fields, defined in the protocol specifications [1], [2].
The header typically contains a pointer to the previous block, a
solution to the PoW, the block creation time, and one or more
roots of Merkle trees [7] that are used as Proof of Inclusion
(PoI) of the transactions in the block, see Sec. II-3.
2) Proof of Work (PoW): The PoW algorithm prevents
uncontrolled generation of blocks by the validators, and guar-
antees that their local blockchain copies are consistent. The
algorithm is run locally by all validators, with the aim to find
a solution to a cryptographic puzzle [1]. The difficulty of the
puzzle is tuned to keep the expected block generation time
constant, typically of the order of tens of seconds [6].
3) Proof of Inclusion (PoI): The Merkle tree roots con-
tained in the header can be used to prove the inclusion of
transactions in the block without the need to download the
entire block body. Specifically, cryptographic hash-values of
the transactions that are included in a block are stored in a
binary Merkle tree [1]. Therefore, any node in possession of
the block header can verify a transaction from another node
by requesting the transaction’s data structure, together with
the Merkle-tree nodes that are required to reconstruct the tree
root. If the root matches the one included in the block header,
then the transaction is included in the block. In Ethereum, a
similar mechanism is used to prove the state of accounts, e.g.,
smart contracts [2].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
1) Blockchain network: The blockchain network relies on
peer-to-peer connections between nodes, including validators
that produce information blocks and store the entire blockchain
list. We assume that validators are interconnected by an ideal
communication network. Furthermore, validators are assumed
to be honest, and, at any time, they store the same copy
of the blockchain. The chain length at time t, i.e., number
of generated blocks, is characterized by the homogeneous
Poisson process h(t) with inter-arrival frequency λB.
2) The IoT device: We consider a generic IoT device u,
with limited storage and energy. For these reasons, it is not
feasible for u itself to validate the blockchain, but instead it
relies on information received from the blockchain network.
The analysis performed in the paper focuses on the case
where u is interested in verifying that a transaction has been
included in the blockchain (step 4 in Fig. 1), rather than on
the transaction creation. This is motivated by the fact that the
creation of transactions is decoupled from their verification,
where communication demands of sending a transaction to
the blockchain (step 3 in Fig. 1) are negligible compared to
the reception of blocks.
In order to verify transactions, u stores a local copy of
the (global) blockchain. We denote the length of the local
blockchain by hu(t) ≤ h(t), which is never longer than
the global, since u is not generating blocks. The process
H(t) = h(t) − hu(t) describes the difference in the number
of blocks between the global and local copy (i.e., how many
blocks u is delayed with respect to the global blockchain) at
time t. The delay in the local copy is caused by blocks created
while u is sleeping to save energy.
Device u is connected to the blockchain network by a
wireless transceiver that connects u with N ≥ 1 blockchain-
network (BN) nodes. The connectivity of u is modelled by the
two-state process S(t) with states S0 and S1. In state S0, u is
connected and the synchronization protocol is triggered by the
creation of new blocks. In state S1, u is sleeping and does not
receive block updates or execute the protocol. Furthermore,
a transition from state S1 to S0 triggers a protocol execution
whose duration is random; the details are given in Sec. IV.
Additionally, an inadequate communication link capacity may
cause the execution of a synchronization protocol to last longer
than the block creation period, requiring multiple executions
in order to achieve synchronization.
We are interested in characterizing H(t) after the execution
of the synchronization protocol. To this end, we define the
discrete-time process, Xk, which samples H(t) at the end
of the protocol executions. A realization of the introduced
processes is illustrated in Fig. 2 with λB = 0.1 s
−1. Observe
that u is sleeping in interval t = [29, 43) s, causing a delay
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Fig. 2. Relationship of block creation process, IoT device state, and delay of
local blockchain.
of the local blockchain copy at k = 2. The blockchain
consistency is achieved after the next protocol execution.
3) Connectivity model: The connectivity process S(t) of a
device can be extremely variable and depends on the type of
device. For instance, a smart meter may wake up periodically
for short time intervals every 15–30 minutes [8]. At the
same time, a smartphone may be turned off during the night
hours, while being connected the rest of the day. In this
work, we consider a model where u goes to sleep after
protocol execution with probability ps, and then sleeps for
a deterministic duration ts.
4) Communication link: We model u’s connectivity to the
blockchain network as a stop-and-wait retransmission protocol
with instant and error-free feedback and independent packet
error probabilities pe,DL in the downlink and pe,UL in the up-
link. For simplicity, we assume that the error probabilities are
independent of packet length and that the sender has unlimited
retransmission attempts (i.e., its packets are eventually deliv-
ered). Under this scheme, the number of transmission attempts
follows a geometric distribution. As a result, the expected
goodputs in the downlink and uplink are gDL = g
M
DL(1−pe,DL)
and gUL = g
M
UL(1 − pe,UL), where g
M
DL and g
M
UL are the
downlink and uplink bit-rates, respectively. Finally, we also
assume that there is an initial connection establishment and
authentication phase of deterministic duration, tc.
The connection to the blockchain network follows a point-
to-multipoint topology when N > 1; when N = 1, u connects
to a single node that acts as a proxy, see Fig. 3. In the
latter case, the proxy needs to be fully trusted, since it can
modify the information forwarded to the IoT device [9]. This
configuration is not investigated in this paper, as it prevents
the implementation of a fully decentralized architecture.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN SYNCHRONIZATION PROTOCOLS
The task of a blockchain synchronization protocol is to
keep u constantly updated with the current state of the
Base station
Blockchain networkIoT devices
u
(a) Point-to-multipoint.
Base station
Blockchain networkIoT devices
u
Proxy node
(b) Point-to-point.
Fig. 3. The considered system architectures.
blockchain. Motivated by the fact that the protocol steps
are not explicitly described by the most popular blockchain
specifications (e.g. [1], [2]), but left to the implementation,
we define two conceptual synchronization protocols: P1 and
P2. They model the minimal amount of information that needs
to be exchanged, while neglecting additional features included
in specific blockchain implementations.
P1 is the simplest protocol variant, in which u receives
complete blocks from BN nodes to which is connected, and
locally verifies the validity of the PoW solution and the
contained transactions. This configuration, adopted in [5],
provides the maximum possible level of security: u needs not
trust the individual BN nodes and is designated as a full node.
However, this is hardly a feasible solution for IoT due to the
high storage and computational requirements, since u needs
to store the complete blockchain and to check all transactions.
Protocol P2 provides a simplified architecture where u,
acting as a light node, only receives the block headers from BN
nodes by default. Furthermore, u defines a list of events that it
is interested in observing, i.e. modifications to the blockchain,
and this list is known by BN nodes.1 Examples of events of
interest are the modification of the state of a smart contract, or
transactions from/to a particular address. Upon the observation
of the events, BN nodes send to u the part of information that
has changed, together with the corresponding Merkle tree that
serves as a PoI, see Sec. II-3. We assume that an event of
interest is independently observed in each block period with
probability pM, which can be tuned by u by changing the set
of events of interests.
To simplify the scenario, we assume that u can only interact
with one BN node at a time (no concurrent transfers), and
that there is a single event of interest. In case that the event
is observed while u is sleeping, the current state of the
blockchain becomes reconstructed based on the header of the
1In efficient implementations, the list is constructed via a Bloom filter that
is matched when the events happen [1].
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Fig. 4. Message exchanges in P1. Downlink is denoted in red, uplink in blue.
most recent block. If u is synchronized and a new block
becomes generated, the protocol execution starts immediately.
If u is not synchronized after the protocol execution ends, due
to the generation of a new block during the execution, a new
protocol execution is started immediately afterwards. When an
execution starts, it does not stop until it is completed, and u
stays awake during the execution. In the following, we describe
possible implementations for P1 and P2.
A. Protocol P1
The information exchange required by P1 depends on
whether u was sleeping or being idle prior to the protocol
execution. Specifically, when u wakes up, i.e., makes a tran-
sition S1 → S0, the following sequence is executed:
(w1,1) u request new blocks from each of the BN nodes via a
message of length ln bits, which contains information
about the highest locally known block hu(t).
(w1,2) u receives a response of length lr bits, from each BN
node, which contains the information of their current
blockchain length h(t).
(w1,3) If h(t) − hu(t) = n > 0 (i.e., Xk > 0), u selects one
random BN node and sends a message of length ln bits,
requesting the missing n blocks.
(w1,4) The selected BN node sends the blocks. Since there are
n blocks, and each block is of length lb bits, the total
length of the message is n · lb bits.
(w1,5) Steps (w1,3)–(w1,4) are repeated until synchronization.
In the second case, u is connected and receives notifications
of new blocks. The steps are:
(s1,1) u receives a notification of the new block from each
of the BN nodes, where the length of the notification
message is lr bits. Starting from the first notification,
it waits tw seconds, to receive all the notifications.
(s1,2) u selects one BN node and requests the missing block.
(s1,3) The selected BN node sends the block.
The message exchanges are depicted in Fig. 4.
B. Protocol P2
The operation of P2 are similar to P1, but the message sizes
in downlink are remarkably smaller. When u wakes up:
(w2,1) u requests of new block to each of the BN nodes, via
a message of length ln bits.
(w2,2) u receives a response of length lr bits from each of the
BN nodes, that contains the list of new blocks available.
(w2,3) u selects one BN node and requests the missing n block
headers.
0 1 2 n...
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Fig. 5. The modelled process and examples of state transitions.
(w2,4) The selected BN node sends the headers. Since each
header is lh bits long, the message length is n · lh bits.
(w2,5) Steps (w2,3)–(w2,4) are repeated until synchronization.
If u is connected and synchronized:
(s2,1) u receives a notification of new block of length lr bits,
from each of the BN nodes. Upon the reception of the
first notification, u waits for tw seconds.
(s2,2) u selects one BN node and requests the missing header.
(s2,3) The selected BN node sends the header.
(s2,4) If an event of interest is observed, the BN node also
sends the data structure containing the information of
interest, which is of length li bith, together with the
PoI that is of length lPoI bits.
V. ANALYSIS
Observe that the adopted sampling makes Xk an irreducible
and positive recurrent Markov process. The goal of the analysis
is to find its transition probabilities (see Fig. 5), which depend
on the adopted protocol and which are derived in the sequel.
The probability of transitioning from state Xk = n to
Xk+1 = m, where the state corresponds to the number of
missing blocks in the local copy of the blockchain, depends
on whether u is sleeping between Xk and Xk+1:
P [Xk+1 = m|Xk = n] = (1− ps) · pS0(m|n)+ ps · pS1(m|n).
(1)
The first term, corresponding to the case that u stays awake
between two protocol executions, is the probability that m
blocks arrive during the protocol execution time tp:
pS0(m|n) =
∫
∞
0
pS0(tp|n)
(λBtp)
m
m!
e−λBtpdtp (2)
where we use the fact that blocks are generated with Poisson
arrivals with parameter λB. For the case where u sleeps
between Xk and Xk+1, the protocol execution time depends
on n and the number of blocks accumulated during sleep,
denoted by q. By marginalizing over q we obtain
pS1(m|n) =
∞∑
q=0
p(m|n, q)p(q)
=
∞∑
q=0
(∫
∞
0
pS1(tp|n, q)
(λBtp)
m
m!
e−λBtpdtp
)
(λBts)
q
q!
e−λBts .
(3)
Note that blockchain protocols might specify a limit on the
number of blocks that can be transferred with one protocol
Blocks created
tp st pt
n=0 n=0 m=1
Idle
Fig. 6. Visualization of protocol execution and block creation process.
execution, which can be easily incorporated in the proposed
model. Also, here we assume the reconnection time (i.e., the
time for discovery of BN nodes and connection negotiation)
to the blockchain network to be negligible and note that the
model can be easily extended by including reconnection time
into tc. We continue by deriving pS0(tp|n) and pS1(tp|n) for
the proposed protocols.
A. Protocol P1
We denote the expected time in order to successfully deliver
a generic protocol message x by ∆tx. In case that u is awake
and synchronized, i.e. n = 0, the protocol execution time is
ts,1 = ∆ts1,1 +∆ts1,2 +∆ts1,3
= g−1DLlr + tw + g
−1
ULlr + g
−1
DLlb.
If u is awake and not synchronized, the duration of the
execution is a function of the number of missing blocks n:
tw,1(n) = ∆tw1,1 +∆tw1,2 +∆tw1,3 +∆tw1,4
= g−1ULNln + g
−1
DLNlr + g
−1
ULln + g
−1
DLnlb.
The distributions of the protocol execution time tp are then
pS0(tp|n) =
{
δ (ts,1) n = 0
δ (tw,1(n)) otherwise,
(4)
pS1(tp|n, q) = δ (tc + tw,1(n+ q)) , (5)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function. If u was sleeping prior
to the protocol execution, the connection time tc should be
included as well: we define ta(k) = tc + tw,1(k) and insert it
into (2) and (3) to obtain
pS0(m|n) =
{
(λBts,1)
m
m! e
−λBts,1 n = 0
(λBtw,1(n))
m
m! e
−λBtw,1(n) otherwise,
(6)
pS1(m|n) =
∞∑
q=0
(
(λBta(n+ q))
m
m!
e−λBta(n+q)
)
(λBts)
q
q!
e−λBts .
(7)
B. Protocol P2
The analysis is similar to the one for P1, where we substitute
lb with lh in all the equations, as in this case u downloads
only block headers. Hence, the time required to download the
header in the synchronized state is:
ts,2 = ∆ts2,1 +∆ts2,2 +∆ts2,3 +∆ts2,4
= g−1DLlr + tw + g
−1
ULlr + g
−1
DLlh.
TABLE I
BLOCKCHAIN PARAMETERS.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
λB 1/12 s
−1 tw 0.5 s
lb 40 kbit lPoI 1536 bit
ln = lr = lh 800 bit li 1000 bit
TABLE II
COMMUNICATION PARAMETERS.
Technology gM
UL
gM
DL
tc
A 1 Mbps 1 Mbps 100 ms
B 100 kbps 150 kbps 1 s
Another difference to P1 is seen in step (s2,4) that refers to
the case when u is awake and synchronized and an event of
interest happens. This triggers the transmission of the infor-
mation modified on the blockchain along with the PoI, which
takes g−1DL(li + lPoI) seconds. The overall time to synchronize
and receive the information modified on the blockchain, i.e.,
to execute steps (s2,1)-(s2,4), is:
tsm = ts,2 + g
−1
DL(li + lPoI).
When u is not synchronized, the time required to download
the headers in P2 is
tw,2(n) = g
−1
ULNln + g
−1
DLNlr + g
−1
ULln + g
−1
DLnlh.
We also define ta,2(n) = tw,2(n) + tc, similarly to ta,1 in
Sec. V-A, which takes into account the reconnection time. If
at least one event of interest happened in one of the blocks,
the protocol also transfers the corresponding information, and
lasts tas = ta,2 + g
−1
DL(li + lPoI) seconds.
The probability that a protocol execution ends with m miss-
ing blocks with respect to the global blockchain is conditioned
on the event that an event of interest is observed, see (8) and
(9).
C. Average idle time
The presented analysis can be used to find several parame-
ters of interest. As an example, here we show how to obtain
the average time spent in idle state, when u is not sleeping
and not communicating (because of being synchronized), see
Fig. 6. We indicate the sojourn time in state k as Zk, then
we have Z0 = e
−λB(t−tp) and Zk = δ(tp) for k > 0. The
set of random variables {Xk, Zk} defines a Markov renewal
process, used to compute the average time spent in idle state,
pi0λ
−1
B (1− ps), where pik is the stationary probability of Xk.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results based on typi-
cal values of blockchain networks. The blockchain parameters,
i.e., block period and messages length, are extracted from
Ethereum protocol statistics and listed in Table I. We assume
that u is connected to N = 6 BN nodes. We evaluate the use of
two wireless technologies, named A and B and characterized
by different capabilities, see Table II; the practical instances
of technologies A and B are LTE Cat M1, and Bluetooth
pS0(m|n) =
{
(λBtsm)
m
m! e
−λBtsmpM +
(λBts,2)
m
m! e
−λBts,2(1− pM) n = 0
(λBtw,2(n))
m
m! e
−λBtw,2(n) otherwise
(8)
pS1(m|n) =
∞∑
q=0
(
(λBtas)
m
m!
e−λBtas
(λBts)
q
q!
e−λBts · (1− (1− pM)
q) +
(λBta,2)
m
m!
e−λBta,2
(λBts)
q
q!
e−λBts · (1 − pM)
q
)
(9)
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Fig. 7. Comparison of analytical (an.) and numerical (num.) transition
probabilities.
Low Energy, respectively, both oriented towards supporting
IoT traffic.
First, we verify the validity of the analytical model, by
comparing it with numerical simulation of the described
processes, implemented in MATLAB. Fig. 7 compares tran-
sition probabilities obtained from (1) and from the numerical
simulation for technology B and protocol P1, showing that the
proposed model, although being simple, succeeds in capturing
all the necessary details. We note that investigations performed
for protocol P2 and/or technology A produce similar results,
which are omitted due to the space constraints.
In Fig. 8, we show the duration of ts,1, i.e., time to
execute P1 when u is synchronized, for different values
of pe,DL, pe,UL: we can observe the difference due to the
different characteristics of the considered wireless interfaces.
The investigations performed for ta,1, twc,1, ts,2, tsm, tas show
analogous results (here omitted) to the ones presented in Fig. 8.
Fig. 9 investigates the behavior of probability of staying
synchronized, i.e., P [Xk+1 = 0|Xk = 0], for P1 and P2 and
as function of system parameters. Two cases are considered:
error-free communication and a channel that is ideal in uplink
but error-prone in downlink; the latter case models the fact
that the messages in the downlink for P1 and P2 are much
longer than in the uplink. The probability of sleeping is fixed to
ps = 0.2, and we vary the duration of sleeping time ts. In Fig.
9(a), we obtain the probability of staying synchronized after
the execution of P1 or P2. The figure shows that, to execute P1,
the wireless interface needs to provide an adequate goodput
to the blockchain application. In Figs. 9(b) and (c) we vary
block size and generation frequency for P1, showing that the
probability of staying synchronized is drastically reduced by
the sleeping duration, and only slightly by the link unreliability
(P2 is not studied here, as it is not affected by variations of
the block size).
Fig. 8. Duration of ts,1 for the considered technologies.
We now investigate the data consumption of the two proto-
cols. In uplink, protocols are only sending control messages,
resulting in a marginal data consumption. In downlink, the
requirements of P1 increase linearly with the accumulated
delay, because the full blocks are downloaded, while for
P2 they vary with the probability that events of interest are
observed, pM. In Fig. 10 we show that the downlink data usage
is significantly reduced with P2 when compared to P1.
Finally, we show how different sleeping parameters impact
the average time spent in the idle, sleeping, and protocol-
executing states, see Fig. 11. We perform a random walk on
the Markov Chain corresponding to technology B and sleeping
probability ps = 0.2, while the sleeping duration ts is varied.
Note that the fraction of time spent in idle state in P2 is only
slightly increased in comparison to P1, although the amount
of exchanged data in P2 is significantly smaller than in P1,
see In Fig. 10. This is due to the fixed time interval tw that is
present in both protocols, during which a device waits for the
response about the current blockchain state from all N BN
nodes to which it is connected (refer to steps (s1,1) and (s2,1)
in Sec. IV).
VII. CONCLUSION
The advent of blockchain-based applications for IoT urges
the research on their requirements to the communications
system. In this work, we investigated several protocols for
synchronization between IoT devices and the blockchain net-
work and proposed a model to study the impact of the
communication link quality and blockchain parameters on the
synchronization process. It was showed that the duty cycle
of the device should be designed by taking into account
both blockchain and communication parameters, as well as
that the choice of the wireless technology that guarantees the
required reliability of the synchronization process depends on
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(a) Impact of sleeping time ts and packet-error
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Fig. 9. Probability of staying synchronized when probability of sleeping if fixed to ps = 0.2.
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Fig. 10. Reduction of downlink data usage in one protocol execution of P2
with respect to the downlink data usage in one protocol execution of P1.
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Fig. 11. Fraction of time spent in protocol states.
the blockchain parameters. Also, it was showed that if the
protocol execution duration is comparable with the average
block-generation period, the probability of staying synchro-
nized rapidly decreases. In order to reduce the duration of an
execution, the use of protocols where the blockchain validation
is delegated to external entities is beneficial, although it
reduces the devices’ security. Finally, we showed that the
blockchain protocols, differently from typical IoT applications
that mostly generate uplink traffic, require the allocation of a
remarkable amount of downlink resources.
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